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Article 3

THE LAW AS A TRADE
Wallace Rudolph*
I have a deep and abiding loyalty to the legal profession. I
recognize that lawyers have a duty beyond most trades to give at
times more service than is justified by the pay. I further recognize
that lawyers have often given more than a fair exchange for money
when they have served unpopular clients, indigent clients and the
like. On the other hand, the fact that law is a learned as well as
a service profession does not eliminate self interest among lawyers.
Like tradesmen, lawyers may place their economic well being above
that of the public. Referring to this nearly universal human trait
Adam Smith once wrote:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment
and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against
the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.'
Can lawyers be an exception to this rule? The answer of the

Committee on Economics of Law Practice is that:
Minimum fee schedules serve as one means of insuring quality
legal service for a fair and adequate charge. The client is entitled
to a better product than the inferior legal service that is frequently
rendered by the lawyer who solicits business by "fee cutting."
For the lawyer, minimum fee schedules base competition within the
profession on skill and the quality of service rather than on the
price charged. This tends to minimize inadequate service and discourage unethical practices. Furthermore, minimum fee schedules
promote efficiency within the profession by encouraging all lawyers
to critically evaluate their operations
and revise or dispose of obso2
lete and inefficient procedures.
For example, in 1897 the Trans-Missouri Freight Association entered into an agreement to establish rates. The association claimed
that its rates were reasonable. The trial court dismissed the government's complaint holding that agreements are not unlawful that
"go to the extent only of preventing unhealthy competition, and
yet at the same time furnish the public with adequate facilities at
• . . reasonable prices. . . ."3 The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed the trial court. Justice Peckham said:
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1 A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATioNs 128 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
2 COMIITTEE ON ECONOACS OF LAW PRAcTIcE, AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, REPORT ON iVInsaum FEE SCHEDULEs 4, 5 (1971).
3 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 53 F. 440, 451 (C.C.D.
Kan. 1892), rev'd, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
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The Claim that the Company... has the right to enter into a combination with competing roads to maintain such rates, cannot be
admitted. The conclusion does not follow from an admission of the
premise. What one company may do in the way of charging reasonable rates is radically different from entering into an agreement
with other and competing roads to keep the rates to that point. If
there be any competition the extent of the charge for the service
will be seriously affected by that fact. Competition will itself bring
charges down to what may be reasonable, while in the case of an
agreement to keep prices up, competition is allowed no play; it is
shut out and the rate is practically fixed by the companies themselves by virtue of the agreement, so long as they abide by it.j
This same position was taken in United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. where Justice Taft said:
Upon this review of the law and the authorities, we can have no
doubt that the association of the defendants, however reasonable
the prices they fixed, however great the competition they had encountered, and however great the necessity for curbing themselves
by joint agreement from committing financial suicide by ill-advised
competition, was void at common law, because in restraint of trade. 5

*

These two decisions have never been questioned. Price fixing,
whether the prices have been reasonable or not, has been illegal
per se. Hence, in.a series of cases involving trade associations the
Court has held that the distribution of average cost figures to the
members of the association only and the required reporting of
actual prices along with admonitions concerning stabilization of
prices can be violations of the anti-trust laws.6 The rationale of
these decisions is simply that trade associations may not be used
as an enforcing mechanism for illegal agreements to fix prices and
that any activities of the associations that might lead to their use
7
as an enforcement mechanism may be banned.
This is not to say that the law has never approved of price
fixing. Indeed what was done illegally by private parties in the
Trans-Missouri Case is now done legally both by the I.C.C. in
regulating railroads and the C.A.B. in regulating airplanes.8 Even
4 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
5 85 F. 271, 291 (6th Cir. 1898), ajFd, 175 U.S.211 (1899).
G Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); Maple
Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); American
Column & Lumber Co. v.United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
7 FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
8 United States v. Chicago M., St. P. & P. Ry., 294 U.S. 499, 506 (1935),
where Justice Cardozo declared: "A zone of reasonableness exists
between maxima and minima within which a carrier is ordinarily
free to adjust to charges for itself. Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. United
States, 289 U.S. 627, 636, 53 S. Ct. 768, 77 L. Ed. 1410; United States v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 263 U.S. 515, 522, 44 S. Ct. 189, 192, 68 L. Ed.
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local railway and utility commissions allow price fixing by local
utilities.9 Moreover, during the great depression price competition
was avoided through the N.R.A. and through the general adoption
of fair trade laws.
Later, of course, the N.R.A. was declared unconstitutional as
an improper delegation to private associations of the governmental
power to fix prices, 10 and the fair trade laws have been repeatedly
under attack both constitutionally and economically as infringement
on competition and the right to contract."
One might well ask why the law is solicitous of the free market.
Why should the law be concerned if competitors fix prices or limit
entry into a field? Or, to be sure, why did Adam Smith conclude
that members of the same trade wish to conspire against the
2
public.'
The answer is that the price for an article or service may vary
between two points. On the up side the price can be as high as the
full economic value to the buyer. For example, suppose that someone has a good claim of $1,000 against another person but that he
needs a lawyer to collect it. He certainly is not willing to pay the
lawyer more than the $1,000. Hence the theoretical absolute limit
would be $999.99. Lawyers are well aware that their charges cannot
exceed the value of their services to the client. In fact, the scaling
down of fees relates to this phenomenon.
In economic terms the cost of a legal service is simply the value
of alternative employment for the lawyer. In the long run, therefore, the cost of legal services is the income the lawyer could have
made in a comparable profession. In the short run, the cost of a
particular legal service is the value of other legal work he could
have done. The spectre facing anyone in any field is the possibility
of temporary excess capacity: in the case of the lawyer the spectre
is excess time. In such a situation a particular lawyer may have
417. We lay to one side cases of discrimination or preference or rivalry
so keen as to be a menace to the steady and efficient service called
for by the statute. Interstate Commerce Act, § 15a. Those tendencies
excluded, 'a carrier is entitled to initiate rates and, in this connection,
to adopt such policy of rate-making as to it seems wise.' United

States v. Illinois Central Central R. Co."
9 NEB. REv. STAT. § 75-119 (Supp. 1969).
10 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), declar-

ing the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 unconstitutional.
11 H. BLAKE & R. PITOFSKY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST LAw 526

(1971).

(Note on State Fair Trade Laws and Other Forms of State

Action to Maintain Resale Prices).
12 See note 1 supra, and accompanying text.
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no present alternate employment and therefore the cost of his
services may be zero. Under such circumstances he may do legal
work at a price that simply covers his office overhead and keeps
him alive. This is especially true when alternate employment is
scarce.
Returning to the long run for a moment, we can see that the
price of legal services cannot fall very much below the value of
alternate employment such as that of accountants, auditors, dentists,
business managers, etc. If it did so fall, entry into the law would
slow until the number of persons trained to give legal services
would be reduced to insure adequate living to the remainder. This
analysis assumes that entry barriers into other professions allow for
reasonable movement. I am aware that each profession attempts to
increase such barriers so that movement laterally across professions
is stayed. Notwithstanding limitations on lateral movement, a low
relative income would soon reduce the number of new entrants.
The actual price of legal service then is set between the
economic value of the service to the client and the cost to the society
of having the lawyer not do alternate work. The lawyer prefers the
price nearest the top of the scale whereas the rest of society prefers
the lower end of the scale. Ultimately, however, the price is set by
competition among lawyers. Yet the lawyers have agreed to limit
price competition through fixing prices. What is the effect of such
price fixing? If the price fixed for a particular legal service is
greater than the economic value of the service to the person desiring
it, he will not buy it. The popularity of free legal service has shown
that the price of many legal services was too high to be economically
useful to poor people. Even middle class people will not purchase
services that they may desire. 13 Clearly the effect of price fixing
is to limit the legal services taken by the public.
Is there, however, a value to the lawyers in price fixing? Price
fixing involves the limitation of price competition. Thus the Committee on Economics of Law Practice asserts that "minimum fee
schedules base competition within the profession on skill and the
quality of service rather than on the price charged."'14 The nonprice competition of which the Committee speaks may be illustrated
by the famous sandwich war among the airlines. In that situation
the airline rates were fixed for coach fares. The regulation limited
the meals served to coach passengers to a sandwich. In order to
attract business under such circumstances the airlines made more
13 B. CEwsTENSEx, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS

34 Conrrr

ON EcoNoBUcs oF LAW PPAcCiCE,

(1970).

supra note 2, at 5.
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and more elaborate sandwiches till it became clear that the very
meaning of the regulation was being subverted. 15 This non-price
competition is not without heavy costs to the public. For example,
price regulation by the C.A.B. has led to the near doubling of prices
set by a free market. Thus, if we compare the unregulated price of
the trip from Los Angeles to San Francisco with the regulated price
of a comparable distance under C.A.B. regulations, we find that in
1965 the unregulated jet fare was $13.50 whereas the regulated fare
for both jet and non-jet travel on the regulated route was $25.65.
We also find that the non-regulated companies operating in the California market had safe and efficient airplanes and that they made
adequate profits. Thus "cut-throat" competition did not produce
either unsafe airplanes nor unprofitable businesses.' 6
The benefits of price fixing are illusory and non-price competition
can be as costly as price competition without the concomitant benefit
to the public. To understand this we must examine what happens
when prices are fixed.
If the prices are fixed too low (i.e., below their alternate value
or below what people will pay), no services will be performed at
that price. Such price fixing results in the shortage of services and
black markets. The example of wholesale abandonment of price
controlled housing in New York is convincing evidence of the failure
of such governmental regulation. Another example of prices fixed
too low is the limitation of ten dollars for legal representation before
the V.A. The effect of this regulation is to preclude legal representa7
tion altogether.
Conversely, if prices are fixed too high, less of the service is
used. Only persons who value the service over the price fixed will
use the service. The remainder of the persons who need the service
15 "In spite of an austerely-worded note from the Montreal headquarters

of the International Air Transport Association listing the six requirements of a "simple, cold and inexpensive sandwich," victory in the
three-week old dispute about the ingredients of an airline sandwich,
third class, appears to have gone to the gourmets-and to common
sense. Only one of the offending European airlines taken to task by
their puritan British and American competitors has actually agreed to
modify the collation served to third-class passengers in place of a
main meal." Recipe for a Sandwich, THE ECONOMSsT, May 3, 1958, at

435.
16 Levine, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and

National Regulatory Policy, 74

17

YALE

L.J. 1416 (1965).

38 U.S.C. § 3404(c) (1959): "The Administrator shall determine and
pay fees to . . . attorneys . . . (2) [which] shall not exceed $10 with
respect to any one claim; and (3) [which] shall be deducted from the
monetory benefits claimed or allowed."
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will either abandon their claims or attempt to have persons outside
the profession do the work for them.
Because of price fixing lawyers are faced with a serious problem
of competitors attempting to do legal services. Thus because of
price fixing, lawyers have abandoned to others, less qualified than
they, the preparation of income tax returns.'8 In some states, moreover, lawyers rarely see form contracts for leases or the sale of real
estate. The Arizona experience in this matter is particularly instructive. The Arizona Bar went to court against the real estate
agents on the question of making real estate form contracts for
the sale of houses. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the agents
were engaged in unauthorized practice of law. The Bar won its
lawsuit; but the real estate agents were not finished. They accused
the Bar of bringing this action simply to overcharge the public and
in a referendum revised the court decision by more than a two to
one vote of the electorate. The reason that the Bar lost was clear:
people were convinced that lawyers were charging much more than
the particular service was worth.' 9
Other effects of the minimum fee are equally clear. If the minimum fees idle some of the lawyers because the fee reduces the
demand, it places great pressure on the lawyers to act unethically
just to stay alive. A lawyer with little business and no prospect
of acquiring more by reducing prices is certainly more likely to act
unethically (i.e., cheat his client) than a lawyer who could simply
reduce prices to earn a living. The absurdity of the situation is
that the emphasis of bar ethics is to call the reduction of prices
unethical while possibly enhancing truly unethical conduct by price
fixing. A further disadvantage of price fixing is that it may induce
more persons to enter the field than can be comfortably supported
by the demand. Thus, if the price fixing is successful, then lawyers
will earn more than comparable professions. In such a situation
persons will be attracted to the legal profession which, because of
the limited demand caused by the price fixing, can no longer support
new lawyers at such fees. Under these circumstances the result
would be either wide-spread price cutting or strong efforts at restricting entry. The medical profession has been able to maintain
its strong economic position mostly by restricting entry through the
continual increase of the cost of medical education. The lawyers
"unfortunately" have not been able to do this: legal education is
18 The IRS reported that over half of the returns now filed are prepared
19

by agents.
Marks, The Lawyers and the Realtors: Arizona's Experience, 49
A.B.A.J. 139 (1963).
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comparatively cheap and can at times be sold at a profit. Obviously,
by increasing the cost of education through well-staffed clinical
programs and small seminars, entry into the legal profession would
be substantially effected.
Price fixing comes into existence during periods of slack demand.
During times such as the thirties the number of lawyers remained
relatively fixed and the demand for the services declined. Competition from underemployed lawyers started to drive down traditional
fees, and the organized 2 0Bar reacted in an attempt through price
fixing to maintain them.
Presently, however, price fixing works against the interest of
the lawyer. The one virtue of price fixing is that it stops some
competition for services and thus keeps the price up. This is useful
only if demand is inelastic, i.e., if at a lower price there would not
be more total revenue. For example, if the price for a simple will
were fifty dollars and at that price 1,000 wills were taken, and if
when the price was reduced to forty dollars only 1,100 wills were
taken, then one could say that the price for wills was inelastic since
the total revenue for wills at fifty dollars was $50,000 and the total
revenue for wills at forty dollars was $44,000. Obversely, if the
number of wills taken at forty dollars were 500 more than the
total taken at fifty dollars, then one could say that the price for a
simple will is elastic since the total revenue at forty dollars would
be $60,000.
Without a full economic study it is unclear whether legal services
are generally elastic or inelastic. I would suggest, however, that
except for probate the demand is quite elastic. Witness, for example,
the great amount of legal business available to OEO Legal Services
when the price is nominal. Probate is, of course, an exception because no one will die simply to have his estate probated more
cheaply. If then the demand for legal services is basically elastic,
it is foolish for the Bar to fix prices, for at lower prices lawyers
could do more work and receive more total money. The Bar might
argue, however, that although this might be true totally, it would
not help the particular lawyer whose time is fully used today at
the higher prices. This is true inasmuch as existing lawyers could
not do all of the increased work generated by lower prices. On
the other hand, if lawyers could hire laymen at non-professional
pay to do a substantial amount of the routine business of a law
20

On Sept. 30, 1937, the original Canon was amended by adding the
third paragraph of the present Canon relating to minimum fee schedules.
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office they could increase their own income and give legal services
at lower prices. This cannot be done at fixed prices, however, since
the demand at high fixed prices will not permit the economic
training of non-professional people. Moreover, if non-professionals
were trained in the absence of a greater demand, they could not be
used efficiently in specialized roles since the client would not pay
even minimum fees when his work was being done by a nonprofessional.
This discussion assumes, of course, that a considerable amount
of the work done by a lawyer could be performed by non-professionals under a lawyer's supervision. Such an arrangement would
release lawyers for work that requires legal analysis and legal
judgment. In this area a good lawyer need not be afraid of
competition since only a limited few in the population are capable
of this kind of work. The median lawyer, to be sure, has an IQ of
126.1 Hence, one may assume that no one with an IQ of less than
116 can successfully do legal work of a non-routine basis. Only
eighteen per cent of the population then could ever be successful
lawyers.22
Formerly, when only five per cent or ten per cent of the population was engaged in work requiring substantial mental ability,
this scarcity did not mean much. Today, when better than twenty
per cent of all jobs require a college education, it is clear that
there is no danger of the legal profession being flooded with persons
who do not have an adequately high-paid alternate employment. It
is this fact, and not price fixing, that has raised the level of income
for lawyers in the last several years. Further evidence that price
fixing has been counter productive is that the greatest increase in
lawyer income has been from partnerships rather than among solo
practitioners. Most income in partnership practice is based on an
hourly rate for business clients which is above the minimum whereas most work done by solo practitioners is based on minimum fee
schedules for non-business clients. Thus the minimum fee schedules
had little to do with this increase in income.
Another reason that price fixing is not needed to support truly
professional services is that the client is aware that differences exist
in lawyer capabilities and certainly the client wishes to retain the
"good lawyer." If a client needs services in the trial field, for example, he wants a lawyer who is likely to win. He is very unlikely
21

Harrell & Harrell, Army General Classification Tests for Civilian Occupations, 5 Educational and Psychological Measurement 229, 231
(1945).

22 L. CRONBACH, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 217 (2d ed. 1963).
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to price-shop since the lawyer price for services may in fact be
higher if he loses his case. Thus in litigation, at least, the client is
much more likely to pay an amount closer to the full economic
value of the service rather than the lower amount equal to the
alternate value of the lawyer's time. This is also true of tax and
business advice. One hires a lawyer in these fields because he is an
expert, a professional. When we turn, however, to routine business
dealings, default divorces, adoptions, application for administrative
permission to do business, form leases, and the like, the client and
the lawyers all know that for the most part lawyers when doing
such work are fungible and that the work requires only a familiarity
with the forms. In such situations the client wishes to receive this
service as cheaply as possible. Hence he will shop and if a lawyer
will not do the work cheaply enough he may well hire a non-lawyer
or do the work himself.
The present system has assured good legal services to persons
or businesses whose need for such services exceeds in value the
minimum fee schedule. The present system fails, however, to serve
the public whenever the need for legal services does not exceed the
value of the minimum fee schedule. The view of the Bar is that
lawyers are entitled to a professional income and therefore must
sell their services at rates that will assure a professional income
when fully employed. The Bar fails to consider that such a rate will
exclude many persons from needed legal services. No one disagrees
that lawyers are "entitled" to a professional income. That they are
so entitled should not be at the cost of inadequate service to the
public. It is now encumbent upon the Bar either to abandon to
others the routine legal services that can be done by trained laymen
at below minimum fees or to organize the distribution of such
services at prices that the public can and will pay. The Bar must
recognize that the threat of competitive legal service comes not only
from non-lawyers but from groups such as unions and others who
23
are employing lawyers to serve their members.
No reason exists then why lawyers cannot serve the whole public
instead of merely the affluent and the poor (the latter by virtue of
public subsidy). For the public may be served by using large
numbers of reasonably intelligent and educated persons who could
be trained as legal assistants. Most routine legal work can be done
by such people under the supervision of a lawyer and at a cost of
only half to three-quarters of the amount beginning lawyers now
receive. The overhead for such persons would not in any way be
comparable to that of a lawyer. Some lawyers are already taking
23

B. CIRsTFSEN,

supra note 13.

THE LAW AS A TRADE
advantage of much legal assistance. In ordinary routine auto litigation, for example, assistants are used to investigate the case, prepare
the complaint and interrogatives, and other similar tasks. Within
this framework the lawyer becomes a manager. But when he does
so, he can receive a substantial-perhaps even higher-professional
income and at the same time offer lower rates which thereby increase substantially the legal service available to the public. In
addition, the lawyer can be assured that no other persons can successfully invade the legal field. Certainly any client would prefer
that a lawyer's office do his tax return, prepare his routine contract,
etc., than that a layman do it if the cost were the same. This arrangement would allow the Bar to compete with the group legal
services offered by unions and the like. Certainly most persons
would prefer independent representation to captured representation
if the price were equal.
Clearly a new organization is needed to supply legal services to
the public. Only after the abandonment of such artificial devices as
price fixing can the use of legal assistants under control of lawyers
come into existence. The demand for legal services by an increasingly affluent society can only be tapped if we learn to supply such
services cheaply and efficiently. This can happen only if we abandon
fixed fee systems and supply all the existing demand. Hopefully the
Bar will reconsider its approach and abandon minimum bar fees to
foster, instead, the training of legal assistants and the delivery of
inexpensive legal services.

